LOGIC §1.1 Truth in Mathematics
"What I like about mathematics," said a student of mine once, "is that, when something is true, you can know for sure that it's true". He was comparing this subject with history where "facts" are constantly challenged and interpretations are numerous.
It is true that there is remarkable agreement among mathematicians around the world about the truth of mathematical statements. Once a theorem is proved it is universally accepted as fact. Occasionally a proof has been challenged and subsequently proved to have a flaw, though in most cases the result ended up being true but just needed a sounder proof. On rare occasions a mathematical result has actually proven to be false. But once that has been pointed out the mathematical community has agreed that it is false and there the matter has rested.
Physics comes close to mathematics in this regard but, as it relies on experiment and the assumption that nature behaves consistently, it allows a small amount of uncertainty to be present. Unlike any of the sciences mathematics is based purely on logic.
Mathematical statements are a mixture of symbols and words. In fact at the more advanced levels the more words and fewer symbols you often find. Now the problem with words is the question of interpretation. What makes this problem more acute is the fact that some concepts use a variety of equivalent words. For example the word "implies" is often expressed using an "if ... then ..." construction or "... is a sufficient condition for ...". Even the word "implies" has various levels of interpretation. In normal language it is used in the sense of cause and effect, sometimes just as a correlation between the truth of two statements. The word "or" can be used in the exclusive sense, excluding the possibility of both. "Would you like tea or coffee?" In mathematics it is usually used in the inclusive sense. And, moreover, there is not always an exact equivalent to such words in other languages.
The way to avoid this possibility for misinterpretation is to use symbols only. Then there would be no need to translate mathematics into other languages. Mind you, this would not be recommended as a general principle. A text book with only symbols and no words would be quite unreadable. There have been some attempts to develop the foundations of mathematics using very few words and indeed these books are very hard to read. On the other hand a purely symbolic version of mathematics would be very appropriate for a computer to process.
A paradigm for truth in mathematics is to have a computer program to verify proofs. It is too much to ask for them to produce new theorems. While computer generated proofs are possible at a very mundane level, important mathematical theorems seem to require considerable mathematical insight which is something that does not seem possible to build into a computer program, at least at this stage.
The basic process of developing a mathematical theory is to present a sequence of definitions, theorems and proofs. A definition is where one mathematical concept is defined in more primitive terms. From the point of view of computerised proof checking definitions could be eliminated with the statement of the theorem being expressed in primitive terms by replacing more complex concepts by their definitions. To do so, of course, would be to stifle mathematical creativity. Mathematicians seem to absorb advanced concepts and these become part of their intellectual apparatus.
Proofs are sequence of mathematical statements set in a logical framework. These statements are not necessarily true. For example when we prove a theorem by contradiction we assume the statement to be false, and then obtain consequences (also false) until we obtain a contradiction. Now what is important to realise is that you cannot prove something from nothing. You have to begin with certain assumptions that are not proved. These are called axioms. Sometimes these are regarded as "intuitively obvious" but, as we have said, intuition can be unreliable.
It is interesting to contemplate that this situation is no different to theology. Religious belief is often derided because the followers accept statements, such as the existence of God, without any proof. One can assert that one knows that God exists intuitively. One can point to the remarkable things that have been done by people with a religious belief. But none of this evidence is considered convincing. Fundamentally the basic truths of a religious belief have to be accepted as axioms.
It is no different with mathematics. There is such a thing as a mathematical creed! The remarkable thing is, and this is where mathematics is very different to theology, most mathematicians accept these creeds, or ones that are logically equivalent. There are a very few exceptions. There is an axiom of set theory, called the Axiom of Choice that is accepted by some mathematicians and rejected by others. But do not think that it is called the Axiom of Choice because one has the choice of accepting or denying it. It is because it makes a certain claim about the possibility of making infinitely many choices.
Actually, mathematicians tend not to divide into two opposed sects, as might be the case if mathematics was a religion. They are more pragmatic than that. Generally they try to prove theorems without using the Axiom of Choice but, if that is not possible, they are happy to use it and they simply note the fact that the proof relies on that axiom.
So the paradigm for mathematical truth is to start with a set of axioms and for the theory to consist of proofs that use only these axioms, definitions and, of course, previously proved theorems.
This sounds a wonderful way of doing things but it must be pointed out that it has been shown that the axiomatic approach has in-built limitations. Gödel has shown that any axiomatic system of any complexity -certainly any that include basic arithmetichave true statements that cannot be proved from the axioms! When you consider that there are such things as undecidable statements in set theory (statements where it can be proved that they can never be proved true from the axioms but also that they can never be proved false) you begin to see that mathematics is not as logically pure as my student seemed to think it is! It is not appropriate here to delve into such exotic depths. We will be sketching how mathematics can be built up from a single set of axioms, and many definitions. What lies below all of this is logic and logic itself has many levels of complexity. Here we shall take a naive view of logic, which is what the vast majority of mathematicians do, and leave the complexities to the logicians.
§1.2 Propositional Logic
All of mathematics can be built on Set Theory. This is not the only possible foundation. The more recent study of Category Theory provides another approach. But each of these foundations rests on an even more fundamental ground -that of logic.
Indeed logic supports all of our rational thought. The surprising thing is that despite some snide remarks about "feminine logic" there are no real cultural differences in logic. It seems that our logic is somehow hard-wired into our brains. Logicians have experimented into alternative logics but they still use the familiar naïve logic to analyse these exotic logics.
Like most of us, mathematicians take logic pretty much for granted, though they do make logic work harder than most people.
The basic object in logic is a statement (or proposition). It is a sentence, possibly involving symbols that can be validly assigned exactly one of the truth values T (true) or F (false). Sentences such as those that ask questions or give commands are obviously excluded. But we must also exclude self-referential sentences such as "This statement is false". If it's true then it's false and vice versa! But avoiding self-referentially it not enough. Consider the following infinite list of sentences: P 1 : At least one of the following is false. P 2 : At least one of the following is false. P 3 : At least one of the following is false. P 4 : At least one of the following is false. ………………………………………… At first sight it might appear that each sentence in the list is saying the same thing, but of course "the following" refers to one less sentence each time as we descend the list. Now if statement P n is false then all of those that follow must be true, including P n+1 . But if P n+1 is true then P m is false for some m > n + 1, a contradiction.
So each statement in the list must be true, also a contradiction.
It's not an easy thing to define precisely what properties a sentence has to satisfy in order to be a statement, so we leave that undefined. We postulate the existence of a collection of primitive statements and focus on compound statements that can be built up from them. The tools for doing this are called logical operators.
The simplest operator is negation. If p denotes a statement then p denotes its negation, the statement that p is false. The other logical operators that we'll consider combine two statements into one.
If p and q are statements then p  q denotes the statement that "both p and q are true", p  q denotes the statement "p or q is true", p  q denotes "p implies q" and p  q means "p and q are equivalent". Now there's something a little imprecise in these definitions. For example "or" can be taken in two ways. There's the "exclusive or" which asserts that one or other is true, but not both, and the "inclusive or" that allows both to be true. In logic, p  q refers to the "inclusive or". The best way to avoid ambiguity is to define these operators in terms of truth tables. These set out the truth value of the composite statements in terms of those of the simpler ones from which they are composed. With two statements there are four possibilities.
p = T, q = T p = T, q = F p = F, q = T p = F, q = F
The truth table for implication may look surprising since it says that a false statement implies a true one. If p is false we say that "p  q is vacuously true". The purpose of defining implication in this way will only make sense when we introduce "quantifiers". For now we must simply accept that the truth table defines the operator rather than the words.
Excessive parentheses can be avoided by defining "" to have higher precedence than "" and "", which in turn have higher precedence than "" and "". So we can write (p  q)  ((p)  q) as p  q  p  q. If we wanted to say p  (q  (p  q)) we'd have to keep these parentheses.
A primitive statement is one that cannot be expressed in terms of simpler ones using any of these functions. A tautology is a statement that is true irrespective of the truth values of its primitives.
Tautologies are logical theorems. For example "(p  q)  (q  p)" doesn't give us any information about the statements p and q. Rather it tells us about the symmetry of the "and" operator.
Example 1:
The following three propositions are tautologies:
(
A proposition can be tested mechanically to determine whether or not it's a tautology by means of a truth table, where all possibilities are considered.
§1.3 Quantifier Logic
A predicate is a statement that involves variables. Predicates become propositions when particular objects (e.g. numbers) are substituted for the variables. The resulting propositions have truth values that depend on those elements.
An n-ary predicate is one which applies to a combination of n elements. Special terms are unary if n = 1, binary if n = 2 and ternary if n = 3.
A unary predicate is what we usually think of as a property, such as "x is even" or "x is female". We could write these symbolically as Ex for "x is even" and Fx for "x is female". There must be some underlying set over which the variables range. In the case of E it might be the set of all integers and in the case of F it might be the set of all students in a particular class.
A binary predicate is what we usually think of as a relation, such as "x < y" or "x knows y". We could write these symbolically as xLy for "x < y" and xKy for "x knows y". The first of these example might have x and y ranging over the set of integers and the second example might have x and y ranging over the set of students in a particular class. But x and y don't have to range over the same set. The relation "x has completed assignment y" could have x ranging over all the students in a particular class and y ranging over the set of assignment numbers.
We commonly denote predicates by upper case letters and the variables by lower case letters. Often the variable names follow the predicate name such as Pn, Qxy and Rabc. But in the case of a binary predicate it's more usual to put one element on each side of the predicate name as in xRy. This is what we usually do in mathematics with predicates such as "x = y" and "x < y".
If P is a unary predicate then xPx means "for all x, Px (is true)" and xPx denotes "for some x, Px", or "there exists x such that Px". "For all" is called the universal quantifier and "for some" is called the existential quantifier.
NOTES:
(1) "Some" means "at least one". Even if Px is true for just one x we're entitled to claim that xPx.
(2) There's some assumed non-empty universe over which we're quantifying.
(3) The variable "bound" by a quantifier is a "dummy" variable and can be replaced by another provided this is done consistently throughout the scope of the quantifier. This means that x(Px  Qx) is equivalent to t(Pt  Qt) or w(Pw  Qw). This is analogous to the dummy variable of integration in a definite integral and to local variables in many computing languages.
(4) When working with quantifiers "Px implies Qx" usually has an implied universal quantifier and should be translated as x(Px  Qx). It's for this reason that implication is defined to be true when the "antecedent" is false.
The statement x(x is even  x 2 is even) has to be true for all integers, including odd ones. The definition of implication makes it "vacuously true" in the case of odd integers.
With a predicate involving two variables there are eight ways they can be quantified: each of x, y can be quantified by  or  and they can be quantified in either order. The logical relationships between them are displayed by the following diagram: Note carefully the difference between xy and yx. The first is the stronger of the two. It implies the second but not conversely. For example xy[x > y] claims that there's an integer larger than every integer (FALSE) while yx[x > y] makes the weaker (TRUE) claim that for every integer there's a larger one.
If xLy means "x loves y" (within an appropriate universe) yx xLy makes the claim that "nobody is unloved" while xy xLy comes close to making the religious claim that "God loves everybody".
The definition of limits in calculus makes subtle use of quantifiers. The statement that "the limit of f(x) as xa is b" is defined as:
  x [( > 0)  (0 < |x  a| < )  (|f(x)  b| < )]. If we interchanged the first two quantifiers we'd get the stronger statement:
  x [( > 0)  (0 < | x  a| < )  (|f(x)  b| < )]. which, in effect, claims that f(x) = b for all x in some region about x = a.
The following properties of quantifiers are assumed as axioms.
(1) xPx  xPx. 
